America, The Asian Power: Embracing Friction & Our Global Destiny


As the focus of warfare shifts to Asia because of the rise of China, and as the UK economy dwindles into despair, I believe South Korea and Japan will become far more important to the United States than Western Europe over the next 50 years. Japan and South Korea will become the new Western Europe for America. Our military, economic, and technological future will increasingly depend on what happens in Asia. When I was in graduate school in South Korea, I argued that the United States was an Asian country. Some people thought that idea was absurd. When I pressed them to explain why, I found that most had no foundational model behind their beliefs. If countries are defined by their values and economic interests, then the United States is an Asian country. We belong in Asia because our interests are there, our allies are there, and our future is there.
South Korea is a self-made, organic democracy. It had no more help getting to where it is today than Elon Musk had becoming the richest person in the world with millions in seed capital decades ago. The original funding explains very little about what either achieved. Koreans built their industries, fought for their democracy, and created one of the most technologically advanced economies in the world. Their success is wholly theirs to own. South Korea is a democracy like the United States, with family values and economic interests similar to our own. I see no reason to treat America as any less Asian because of where our ancestors came from. Asia is as much our sphere of influence to contest as China's, and we are here permanently. I said this directly to Chinese students representing the CCP, to their faces: We are here to stay because this is Asia, and we are an Asian country, so go fuck yourself.
Alfred Thayer Mahan understood that maritime power determines who can protect trade and project military force across the world. Nicholas Spykman understood that the Eurasian Rimland, including East Asia, would determine the global balance of power. Japan and South Korea now sit at the center of industries that America depends on, including semiconductors, shipbuilding, and advanced manufacturing. Our military position in Asia depends heavily on both countries. We should organize our long-term strategy around that reality.
The world is going to change, and so is where the United States puts its attention. We are not going to hide behind our borders, focus on our hemisphere, and embrace all that stupid shit that Peter Zeihan and his followers believe. We have the geographic advantages and resources to project power anywhere in the world. We have a world order to run indefinitely. Americans need to stop being wimps and get a second wind. I think much of this renewed enthusiasm for isolationism comes from a biological instinct to avoid confrontation. Americans increasingly rationalize retreat because they are uncomfortable with friction. Social media has made the cost of being disliked more visible than ever. People can now watch millions of strangers criticize them, reject them, and question their character. Americans want to be liked, and I believe that is one of our greatest insecurities. It reveals how uncertain we have become about our place in the world.
That insecurity affects how we exercise power. We begin to care about the emotional reactions of people whose interests directly conflict with our own. We become concerned about being called aggressive, arrogant, or insensitive. We start treating disapproval as evidence that we have done something wrong. Our adversaries can exploit this through flattery, public criticism, and appeals to peace. We need to get over it. Being disliked for the right reasons should leave us completely unmoved. George Kennan understood that containing a powerful adversary could require decades of sustained pressure. Thomas Schelling understood that credible threats, commitments, and the willingness to accept risk influence how adversaries behave. We should take those lessons and apply them directly to China. We should deliberately create strategic friction along China's borders and across every domain of competition, indefinitely. Every attempt by Beijing to establish regional dominance should encounter American resistance.
We should refuse to accommodate China's ambitions or make room for its expansion. We should maintain an aggressive presence around everything Beijing considers strategically important. That means military power, economic competition, technological superiority, intelligence operations, and sustained kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. We should be in their faces at every turn. China should understand that American power will remain a permanent fact of life in Asia. We should be prepared to be mean to people who smile at us, flatter us, and say they need peace while pursuing ambitions that threaten our interests. Their appeals for peace and their flattery should fall on deaf ears when they expect us to accommodate their expansion. We should judge them by their actions and the interests they pursue. There is nothing we are willing to trade for what we ultimately want. We should be comfortable being disliked by people who oppose our ambitions.
We also need to stop learning the wrong lessons from our past. The fact that two wars may have been mistakes does not mean the next war will be. Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan taught us about failed assumptions, political objectives, and the costs of military intervention. Those lessons should make us more capable of judging the next conflict on its own merits. We need to be nuanced people who can recognize mistakes without turning them into permanent rules. The next war might be the right one to fight. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer understood that international politics operates through power and competition. Waltz explained how the distribution of power constrains states. Mearsheimer explained why great powers seek regional dominance and compete for security. Their work gives us a way to understand what China wants, why it wants it, and how it will respond to American power.
I want to take the end of history that Francis Fukuyama envisioned and pursue it through the strategic realism of Waltz and Mearsheimer. We should use their understanding of power, competition, and the international system to pursue Fukuyama's liberal democratic end state. Realist methods inx pursuit of a liberal idealist objective. We should be pragmatic about how power works and uncompromising about what we intend to achieve. What we want is to finish what we started in the Cold War. We want the real version of the end of history, even if it takes another 100 years to get there. We should be prepared to compete over political systems, technology, industry, and military power for generations. We should expect hostility and learn to live with it.
The Cold War demanded patience measured in decades. The next century may demand even more. We need to bring back the American willingness, starting with elementary school education across the country, to confront adversaries, endure hostility, and become comfortable with being disliked without interpreting disapproval as a signal to change course. We must teach future generations to stand by their convictions, build extraordinary industrial power, and pursue our ambitions without asking the world for permission. We need our young people to find purpose in seeking friction, sitting in it, and developing the capacity to endure it indefinitely. That includes confronting those we perceive as vulnerable and holding them to the same standards as those we consider invulnerable. We must eliminate the hierarchy of victimhood as a source of purpose, identity, and belonging. We should raise generations that find meaning in courage, responsibility, achievement, and the willingness to endure friction. We have a world order to run indefinitely, and we should act like it.

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